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ABSTRACT 
 
WOULD RMB APPRECIATION LEAD TO THE LIQUIDITY TRAP IN CHINA? 
LESSONS FROM COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF JAPAN AND GERMANY  
 
By  
 
Shi Ziguo 
 
 
 
With 30 years worth of high-speed development, currently the huge trade surplus 
generated the pressure of Chinese Yuan (RMB) appreciation. Many researchers worry about 
the economic outlook of China because Japan’s liquidity trap happened right after the 
appreciation of the Japanese Yen, and this concern has been a popular argument against RMB 
appreciation as well as the option of a floating exchange rate regime. 
However, even though Japan and Germany experienced the same currency appreciation, 
only Japan fell into the liquidity trap. This comparative study shows that currency 
appreciation was not the reason for Japan’s liquidity trap. Actually, the difference of interest 
rate between Japan and Germany took place right after the asset price bubbles burst in Japan, 
which undermined the effect of easy monetary policy in 1990s. 
Currently, China is facing the same conditions as what Japan and Germany experienced 
from the late 1980s to the early 90s. Ever since the appreciation of RMB in July 2005, 
China’s asset prices, like those of Japan, have rapidly increased. But China undertook 
monetary policies and administrative measures to prevent the rise of bubbles. Just like what 
was witnessed in Germany, China’s interest rate and inflation rate will correlate positively 
with the growth rate of monetary aggregate.  
In the future, if the Chinese authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market to delay 
the appreciation, then the market power would expect further appreciation. The continual 
expectation of appreciation would cause the inflow of abundant liquidity, which would 
increase interest and inflation rates in the long term. If no government intervention is 
involved in the foreign exchange rate, the capital inflow will lead the exchange rate to an 
equilibrium level as the market expects. Since the domestic liquidity is independent of the 
foreign exchange rate market, the inflation and interest rates will be immune to any 
fluctuations derived from the exchange rate.  
  
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
Shi Ziguo 
2012
i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
This thesis was accomplished with support of many people. They contributed through 
stimulating ideas, sacrificing time, and giving proper motivation. I am grateful to Professor 
Cho, Dongchul for his time and kind help. 
ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................................... 3 
2.1 Liquidity Trap in Japan ............................................................................................... 4 
2.2 Debates on China’s Exchange Rate Regime ............................................................... 4 
2.3 Previous Comparative Studies on Yen and RMB Appreciations ................................ 5 
3 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CASES OF JAPAN AND GERMANY ......................... 6 
3.1 Similar Appreciation and Monetary Policy Responses ............................................... 7 
3.2 Different Capital Market Performances .................................................................... 10 
3.2.1 Asset Price Bubbles in Japan .......................................................................... 10 
3.2.2  Capital Market Stability in Germany ........................................................... 14 
3.3 Divergence between Japan’s and Germany’s Interest and Inflation Rates ............... 16 
4 LONG-TERM DETERMINANTS OF THE INTEREST RATE ....................................... 17 
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA .......................................................................................... 20 
5.1.1 From the Hard Peg Regime to the Crawled Pegged Regime .......................... 20 
5.1.2 Monetary Supporting Measure for the Pegged Regime .................................. 22 
5.2 Unsustainability of China’s Current Crawled Pegged Regime ................................. 23 
5.2.1 Crawled Pegging Sacrifices Monetary Policy Autonomy .............................. 23 
5.2.2 Administrative Measures Eroding Economic Efficiency ................................ 24 
5.3 Which Way for China – German or Japanese? ......................................................... 25 
5.3.1 Stock Market Fluctuation in China ................................................................. 25 
5.3.2 House Price Increase and Strict Real Estate Market Regulations ................... 27 
5.3.3 Inflation Rate Increase with Currency Appreciation ...................................... 29 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 30 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 33 
iii 
 
 LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Exchange rate of Japan and Germangy ............................................................... 7 
Figure 2: Nominal GDP growth rate of Japan and Germany .............................................. 8 
Figure 3: Japan and Germany export growth rate ............................................................... 8 
Figure 4: Japan and Germany's discount rate ..................................................................... 9 
Figure 5: CPI of Japan and Germany ................................................................................ 10 
Figure 6: Interest rate of Japan and Germany ................................................................... 10 
Figure 7: Japan's land price ............................................................................................... 11 
Figure 8: Japan's Monetary aggregates, asset prices and CPI ........................................... 12 
Figure 9: Monetary Aggregates in Japan .......................................................................... 13 
Figure 10: Loans outstanding by industries in Japan ........................................................ 13 
Figure 11: Stock prices of Japan and Germany ................................................................ 14 
Figure 12: The growth rate of Germany's land price ........................................................ 14 
Figure 13: The growth rate of Germany's house price ...................................................... 15 
Figure 14: Loan outstanding by industries in Germany .................................................... 15 
Figure 15: Money aggregates in Germany ........................................................................ 16 
Figure 16: CPI growth rate and interest rate in Japan ....................................................... 18 
Figure 17: CPI growth rate and interest rate in Germany ................................................. 18 
Figure 18: Japan's exchange rate and interest rate ............................................................ 20 
Figure 19: China's exchange rate ...................................................................................... 22 
Figure 20: China's monetary response to the consumer price and stock price ................. 26 
iv 
 
Figure 21: Residential property rental index in China ...................................................... 28 
Figure 22: International comparison of price bubbles ...................................................... 28 
Figure 23: China's house price in big cities (2011) ........................................................... 28 
Figure 24: Monetary aggregates in China ......................................................................... 29 
Figure 25: New mortgage loans in China ......................................................................... 30 
 
v 
 
List of Symbols or Abbreviations 
 
 
USD: United States dollar  
RMB: Renminbi the official currency of China (People's Republic of China) 
GDP: Gross domestic product  
CPI: Consumer price index  
BOJ: Bank of Japan 
IMF: International Monetary Fund  
BIS: Bank for International Settlement 
FDI: Foreign direct investment  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since the elimination of the exchange control on current account transactions by the 
Central Bank of China in 1994, the nominal exchange rate has remained stable. Moreover, 
there has been a steady expansion of China’s export and import during the 1990s and an 
accelerated growth after 2000. China’s current account as well as capital and financial 
account have begun to post a “twin surplus” since the 1990s. In 2004, the surplus under the 
current account reached USD 70 billion. Meanwhile, China’s surplus under the capital and 
financial account, including net errors and omissions, totaled USD 132 billion (People’s Bank 
of China 2004). On July 21, 2005, the People’s Bank of China announced the reform of the 
exchange rate regime. After a 2 percent of immediate appreciation, RMB has undergone a 
gradual appreciation. Up to August 2011, the RMB had appreciated to 6.3867 per dollar, 
which was an appreciation of about 22.87%.  
The current economic situations in China are similar to those of the Japan in the late 
1980s. Right after the remarkable appreciation of yen, Japan’s economy slipped into the 
liquidity trap and the deflation slump. Some researchers (McKinnon and Ohno 2000; 
McKinnon and Goyal 2004) attribute the low interest rate liquidity trap to the Yen 
appreciation. At present, there are many similar characteristics of China’s situation to that of 
Japan in the late 1980s, such as the huge current account surplus, high saving ratio and 
excessive dependence on export. So McKinnon (2005, 2006) predicts that China would 
follow Japan into the liquidity trap if the authorities let RMB appreciate.  
However, the Deutsche Mark also appreciated in a similar proportion during the same 
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period of Japanese Yen appreciation. If the appreciation were the reason for liquidity trap, 
Germany should have gone into the liquidity trap as well. On the contrary, we have witnessed 
a different case in Germany.  
The comparative study shows that the reason for low interest and inflation rate is not the 
appreciation but the monetary supply in the long run.  In Germany, the easy monetary policy 
successfully induced the increase of the inflation rate, while Japan experienced a long period 
deflation. Actually the divergence of interest rate between Japan and Germany took place 
right after the bubble burst in Japan, which undermined the effect of easy monetary policy in 
1990. 
In China, since the gradual appreciation started in July 2005, the asset prices has gone 
up like Japan. But China’s authorities took administrative measures to prevent bubbles from 
forming. Without the bubble forming and busting, China’s easy monetary policy would 
increase money supply and further bid up the interest rate like what happed in Germany.   
McKinnon (2006) argues that had China broadened the control on the international 
capital flow and interest rate, RMB appreciation would lead to capital inflow which was an 
impetus to reduce interest rate. In that case, the liquidity trap in Japan would recur in China. 
In fact, there is no direct relation between currency appreciation and interest rate in the long 
run. The nominal interest rate is determined by the inflation rate which is subject to the 
change of money supply. In the 1990s, Japan’s easy monetary policies failed to increase the 
monetary aggregation (M2) because of the bubble burst. However, in China, the capital 
appreciation was stopped by administrative measures and the easy monetary policy would not 
fail. So the interest rate would be determined by monetary policy. 
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Without the weakened effect of bubble burst on monetary policies, China’s interest rate 
and inflation rate would correlate positively with monetary policies like Germany’s 
experience. On one hand, if the Chinese authorities intervene into the foreign exchange 
market to delay the appreciation, investors would expect further appreciation. Furthermore, 
the continued appreciation expectation would cause capital inflow and abundant liquidity. In 
the long run, the abundant liquidity will increase the inflation and interest rates. On the other 
hand, if there is no government intervention involved in the foreign exchange rate, the capital 
inflow would keep the exchange rate on an equilibrium level as the market expects. Since 
domestic liquidity is independent of the foreign exchange market, the inflation and interest 
rates will be immune to the fluctuation derived from the exchange rate.   
This paper is intended to be organized as follows. Section 2 will review the previous 
studies on China’s exchange rate regime and comparative studies on the appreciation of Yen 
and RMB. Section 3 will compare the appreciation experiences of Japan and Germany in the 
late 1980s as well as the aftermath of economic performances in the early 1990s. Section 4 
will discuss the interest rate and determinants of inflation rate in the long run. Section 5 will 
review China’s RMB appreciation since 2005 and analyze the trend of interest and inflation 
rates. Section 6 is the summary and conclusion.   
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section summarizes the existing debates on Japan’s liquidity trap, China’s exchange 
rate regime and comparative studies on Japanese and Chinese currency appreciations. 
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2.1 Liquidity Trap in Japan 
The concept of liquidity trap is coined by Keynes (1936), referring to a situation that the 
injection of money by central bank is unable to lower the interest rate when the interest rate is 
close to zero. When the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was first 
published, there were heated disputes on the concept of liquidity trap. Concerning the zero 
interest period of over a decade, it is generally accepted that Japan has been reduced to the 
liquidity trap since 1995. Nevertheless, Weberpals’ study (1997) has found that although 
there was no evidence for the liquidity trap in Japan between 1991 and 1995, the monetary 
policies had less effect on the interest rate than those in other periods. In other words, Japan 
had been on the way to the liquidity trap from 1991 to 1995.  
2.2 Debates on China’s Exchange Rate Regime 
Ever since 2003, China’s exchange rate regime has remained a hot macroeconomic topic 
worldwide.  Because of the accumulation of surplus in both current and capital accounts, 
most economists argue that the Chinese RMB has been significantly undervalued (Funk and 
Rahn 2005; Garton and Chang 2005) . Especially the reports of the United States 
Congressional Research Service (Morrison and Labonte 2008, 2011; Lim, et al. 2006) claim 
if the Chinese authorities let the RMB exchange rate float, at the disposal of the market 
supply and the demand of Chinese goods, the current surplus would reduce, which would in 
turn alleviate the trade deficit of the United States. 
However, the calculation of equilibrium level of exchange rate is still controversial. 
Many studies have produced different results by applying different methodologies or 
variables to calculate. By applying the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate model and the 
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permanent equilibrium exchange rate model to estimate RMB equilibrium exchange rate, 
Funke and Rahn (2004) have found that RMB has not been significantly undervalued.   
However, some studies hold different views from those of the United States 
Congressional Research Service. They insist that RMB appreciation alone can not 
substantially change the conditions of international trade positions and reduce the trade 
deficit of United States, because the other emerging Asian countries will substitute for 
China’s export (Isabelle et al.2011; McKinnon 2007; Zhou 2006). Cui (2007) states that the 
prices of Chinese products have been so much dominated by the prices of imports that the 
exchange rate appreciation can not change the prices of Chinese export products too much. 
China’s authorities are prudential in choosing the flexible exchange regime. After the 
Asian crisis, the pegged exchange rate of RMB has become the anchor of Asian economy 
which has not only contributed to the stability of China’s financial system but also stabilized 
that of other Asian countries (Zhou 2003). McKinnon and Schnabl (2009) provide their 
advices that Chinese RMB exchange rate appreciate gradually under the conventional narrow 
band. 
2.3 Previous Comparative Studies on Yen and RMB Appreciations 
A conclusion of the comparative studies on Japan and China’s experiences is that China 
should be careful of the possibility of liquidity trap due to currency appreciation (McKinnon 
and Schnabl 2003; McKinnon and Goyal 2004; McKinnon 2005, 2006; Papa 2010; Danne 
and Schnabl 2008) though the causes of Japan’s liquidity trap are still unclear. Various 
studies provide different causes of the liquidity trap in Japan, such as Japanese Yen 
appreciation (McKinnon and Ohno 2000; McKinnon and Goyal 2004), the government 
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intervention on the appreciation of Japanese yen (Danne and Schnabl 2007), the collapse of 
asset price bubbles (Weberpals 1997; Shiratsuka 2003), and the financial deregulation (IMF 
2011) . 
McKinnon has published a series of papers to argue that China would follow Japan into 
the liquidity trap. McKinnon uses the interest parity theory to analyze the impact of RMB 
appreciation on interest rate. The formulation is as follows: 
 i = i* +E(ê) +φ 
The domestic nominal interest rate (i) is determined by the foreign nominal interest 
rate( i*) , the expectation of exchange rate (E(ê)) and risk premium (φ). If the foreign 
interest rates decline and the domestic currency appreciation expectation is positive, the 
domestic interest rate will be bid down by the capital inflow. The long-term low interest rate 
policies in U.S. will involve China into the liquidity trap. The more liberalized China’s 
financial system is, the more salient the impact of appreciation on the interest rate will 
become. The liberalization includes: (1) the abolishment of domestic interest rate restrictions 
on bank deposits and loans; (2) the removal of controls on international financial flows. 
If there is unsterilized intervention on foreign exchange market, the domestic monetary 
base will increase and the short-term rates will go down. Otherwise, if the government 
intervention and capital account control are removed, the pressure from free international 
financial arbitrage between dollar bonds and RMB bonds will also nudge down interest rate 
at longer maturities (McKinnon 2006).  
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3 COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CASES OF JAPAN AND GERMANY 
 China’s current conditions are similar with those of Japan and Germany in the 1980s. 
Some researchers believe that Yen appreciation led Japan to the liquidity trap and China 
would repeat Japan’s liquidity trap. However, Japan and Germany experienced the same 
currency appreciations but only Japan went into the liquidity trap, suggesting that currency 
appreciation was not the cause of Japan’s liquidity trap. 
3.1 Similar Appreciation and Monetary Policy Responses 
Japanese and German currency appreciations occurred between 1985 and 1988. After the 
famous Plaza Accord, the Japanese Yen appreciated by 90% from 254 per dollar to 134, and 
the Deutsche Mark appreciated by 68% from 3.17 per dollar to 1.89 until December 1988 
(Figure 1). The GDP growth rates in both countries were battered by the downturn of exports. 
The authorities of both countries repeatedly tried to stem the trend and smooth the fluctuation 
by intervening in the US dollar market and accommodating money growth (Manfred J.M. 
Neumann. 1996). 
 
Figure 1: Exchange rate of Japan and Germangy 
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In April 1985, the growth rate of Japanese export ended its expansion and began to 
decline from 2.85 percent to minus 19.46 percent, which was really a big shock to the Japan’s 
economy. The GDP growth rate of Japan collapsed from 7.16 percent in 1985Q4 to 1.86 
percent in 1986Q3. Likewise, Germany experienced a similar episode to what happened in 
Japan. The Germany’s export growth rate went down from 6.59 percent in June 1985 to 
minus 4.54 percent in August 1986, and the GDP growth rate decreased from 5.98 percent in 
1985Q2 to 2.14 percent in 1987Q1. (Figure 2 and Figure 3) 
 
Figure 2: Nominal GDP growth rate of Japan and Germany 
 
Figure 3: Japan and Germany export growth rate 
Both of the two countries undertook easy monetary policies in order to mitigate the 
downward tendency of export. The Bank of Japan executed a series of discount rate 
reductions, cutting the rate from 4.5 percent to 2.5 percent. Bandesbank also reduced the 
discount rate from 5 percent to 2.5 percent. (Figure 4) 
9 
 
 
Figure 4: Japan and Germany's discount rate 
As a result of easy monetary policies, export and output recovered strongly. In Japan, the 
export growth rate increased from minus 19.46 percent in September 1986 to 11.89 in 
December 1989 and GDP growth rate recovered from 1.49 percent in 1987Q1 to 7.69 percent 
in 1990Q3. In Germany, the export growth rate rose from minus 4.54 percent in August 1996 
to 6.78 percent in April 1989 and the GDP growth rate increased from 2.14 percent in 
1987Q1 to 9.66 percent in 1990Q3.  
During the currency appreciation period, the fluctuations in inflation and interest rates 
were similar in two countries (Figure 2 and Figure 3). From 1985 to 1990, their interest rates 
were almost the same, which fluctuated between 3 percent and 8 percent. The interest rates in 
both countries went down gradually after the Plaza Accord in 1985, and rebounded from 
1988. The inflation rates also declined from 1985 and rebounded back from 1987. There was 
no sign of deflation and liquidity trap in Japan.  
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Figure 5: CPI of Japan and Germany 
 
Figure 6: Interest rate of Japan and Germany 
 
3.2 Different Capital Market Performances 
3.2.1 Asset Price Bubbles in Japan 
From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Japan’s asset markets experienced significant 
fluctuations. The prices of real estate, especially in the large cities such as Tokyo, Osaka and 
Nagoya, increased rapidly since 1986. Land prices went up to its peak in September 1990, 
nearly five times of the prices of 1985 (Figure 7). In late 1990, the total land value in Japan 
was estimated to be nearly $20 trillion, which was more than 20 percent of the world’s total 
wealth. The stock price also increased sharply, and the Nikkei 225 rose from ¥12,598 to 
¥38,915 between 1985 and 1989. Then it collapsed to ¥14,309 in August 1992, more than 60 
percent below the peak (Kunio et al. 2001). 
11 
 
 
Figure 7: Japan's land price 
In the late 1980s, both of the asset prices and the money supply increased. The economy 
overheated, but the consumer price, remained quite stable. From 1985 to 1990, the asset 
prices, including stock and land prices, increased rapidly with the money supply climbing up 
(Firgure8). However, it was very difficult for the Bank of Japan to distinguish whether the 
economy was overheating. The study of the Bank of Japan (Okina et al. 2001) provided the 
evidence that when the bubble formed, the Bank of Japan was concerned with the inflationary 
pressure and adverse effects of excessively easy monetary policy at a quite early stage. Yet at 
that time, the inflation rate and other related indicators were stable. There seemed no 
sufficient reason to take tight monetary policy to slow down the increase of asset prices. 
Furthermore, there was no common understanding about the results of the increase in asset 
prices. For instance, in 1987 when asset prices increased sharply, the Bank of Japan discussed 
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the possibility of monetary tightening in view of concern with inflation and excessive 
monetary easing, but they were unable to present a sufficiently convincing argument for 
tightening (Okina et al. 2001). Immediately after the bubble burst, many scholars argued that 
the Bank of Japan should have taken tight monetary policy in an earlier stage.  
 
Figure 8: Japan's Monetary aggregates, asset prices and CPI 
The early 1990s witnessed a sharp decrease of the asset prices. In the aftermath of the 
bubble bust, nonperforming loans accumulated in the financial system. The inflation and 
interest rates declined and the Japanese economy entered the period of deflation and zero 
interest rate. As the study of Okina et al. (2001) showed, the bubble burst undermined the 
effect of easy monetary policy. The behaviors of different money aggregates suggested that 
the effect of monetary easing was different and unusual, compared with that in the past. First, 
when the liabilities of the BOJ (monetary base) increased significantly, money supply 
(M2+CDs) growth rate was much lower than that of monetary base. At the same time lending 
funds of commercial bank were declining (Figure 9). Second, in the aspect of loan allocation, 
figure 10 shows that loans to manufacturing industries decreased in 1990s while loans to real 
estate industries rose until 1998. 
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The loans to real estate, which contained implicit risks, eroded the capital bases of 
financial institutions and reduced their risk-taking capabilities. To avoid realizing the losses 
from non-performing loans, financial institutions continued to supply credits to unprofitable 
companies, leaving little resources that could be provided for profitable ones. After the 
bubble burst, the monetary easing could not effectively counterbalance the downward spiral 
of the economy. The effects of interest rate cuts on the money supply was reduced, because of 
the negative impacts of worsened balance sheets  of the firms as well as banks. 
Figure 9: Monetary Aggregates in Japan 
Figure 10: Loans outstanding by industries in Japan 
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3.2.2  Capital Market Stability in Germany 
During the same period, however, German stock market and real estate markets 
remained quite stable. According to the data from IMF, the German stock price index rose 
only 75.31 percent while that of Japan tripled (Figure 11). The real estate price index was also 
much more stable than that in Japan. As figure 12 and figure 13 shows, the highest annual 
growth rate of German land and housing prices was smaller than 10 percent. 
 
Figure 11: Stock prices of Japan and Germany 
 
 
 
 Figure 12: The growth rate of Germany's land price 
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From 1991 to 1998, the growth rate of house loans to domestic enterprise and resident 
individuals was not remarkably higher than those to other industries. The data from BIS 
(Bank for International Settlement) show that the growth rate of house loan was not as high 
as that of Japan, though higher than the total loan (figure 14). As figure 15 shows, the growth 
rate of M3 didn’t significantly deviate from that of monetary base.  
 
Figure 14: Loan outstanding by industries in Germany 
Figure 13: The growth rate of Germany's house price 
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3.3 Divergence between Japan’s and Germany’s Interest and Inflation Rates 
The divergences of Japan’s and Germany’s interest and inflation rates started in 1991 
(Figure5 and Figure6). Since September 1993, Japan’s interest rate had been sustaining lower 
than 3%, and became even lower than 2% in April 1995 (Figure 6), which was actually the 
sign of a possible liquidity trap. However, from 1991 to 1996, there was not much 
appreciation of the exchange rates in Japan and Germany. The Japanese Yen appreciated 
17.7% from 134 to 114 per dollar and the Deutsche Mark fluctuated from 1.8 to 1.4 per U.S. 
dollar (Figure 1).  
McKinnon (2003) attributes the liquidity trap to the appreciation of the Yen, which led to 
the arbitrage behavior of market; however, data from 1985 to 1996 proves that McKinnon’s 
explanation is unreliable. In 1985, the exchange rates of Japan and Germany experienced 
sharp appreciations and robust appreciation expectations. It can be seen that the interest rates 
rose from 1987 to 1990 in Japan and Germany. In 1991, both countries’ interest rates 
decreased gradually, but Germany’s interest rate was about 2% higher than that of Japan. If it 
was market arbitrage behavior that bade down Japan’s interest rate, then it would be a 
Figure 15: Money aggregates in Germany 
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short-term effect and the interest rate would fall right after the appreciation appeared. The 
timespan from 1985 to 1991 was too long to attribute the interest rate decrease to the Yen 
appreciation expectation.  
Faced with similar appreciations, Japan was fell into the liquidity trap, whereas 
Germany’s economic performance was much better. The interest rates of Japan and Germany 
diverged around 1991. Although both countries’ interest rates decreased, the German interest 
rate was significantly higher than that of Japan since 1991. After the downturn period, Japan 
entered the era of zero interest rate. From 1985 to 1991, both countries experienced rapid 
appreciations following the downtrend of exports and GDP growth rates. Then, the easy 
monetary policies were conducted and a strong recovery was achieved; however, when 
Japan’s famous bubble burst, the difference between the interest rates of Japan and Germany 
began and continued into the long term.  
 
4 LONG-TERM DETERMINANTS OF THE INTEREST RATE 
According to the Fisher’s (1907) theory, long-term nominal interest rates are determined 
by two factors: (1) real interest rate, and (2) expected inflation rate. The Fisher equation is: 
rr = rn − πe 
This means that the nominal interest rate (rn) minus the expected rate of inflation (πe) 
equals the real interest rate (rr). If rr is assumed constant, rn must rise when πe rises. There is a 
one-to-one adjustment of the nominal interest rate to the expected inflation rate. The data of 
Japan and Germany show that the interest rate perfectly correlates with the inflation rate 
(Figures 16 and 17).  
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Figure 16: CPI growth rate and interest rate in Japan 
 
 
Since Friedman (1956) and Lucas (1980) established their “quantity theory”, the 
one-to-one relationship between long-term inflation and money supply has been generally 
accepted.  
Money × Velocity = Price × Output 
Given an income velocity of money (Velocity) that is constant, the price will be 
determined by the money aggregate and the amount of output.  
If we let ‘M2’ stand for the money aggregate, ‘consumer price level’ for price level and 
‘GDP’ for the output, it can be found that the quantity theory held true in both Japan and 
Germany at the every period. Japan’s deflation was caused by the failure of expanding money 
Figure 17: CPI growth rate and interest rate in Germany 
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supply (M2) through easy monetary policy because the commercial banks were unwilling to 
lend money when the bubble burst.  
Based on the principle of interest parity, McKinnon (2003) forms a model of the 
liquidity trap with international arbitrage. This model was developed through his analysis 
provided in Section 2. In this model, the Japanese nominal interest rate is determined by the 
expected appreciation of Yen against the Dollar, as well as the American nominal interest rate. 
McKinnon applies this model to explain the relationship between Japanese Yen appreciation 
and the liquidity trap. This model, however, does not explain why Germany did not fall into 
the liquidity trap with similar appreciation during the same period. 
Actually, the interest parity model only holds true in the short run. McKinnon’s 
explanation simply assumes that the continuous appreciation expectation would make the 
short-term effect appear again and again. According to McKinnon (2003, 2006), the 
expectation of Japanese Yen appreciation attracted capital inflow from foreign countries, 
which further bade the domestic interest rate lower than the foreign interest rate. If the 
expectation was rational, then the appreciation expectation would be stronger when the 
Japanese Yen appreciated faster, and more capital inflow would widen the gap between the 
domestic and foreign interest rates. From 1985 to 2000, Japan’s exchange rate was not 
appreciating in a straightforward manner (Figure 18). As the graph shows, if the expectation 
was rational, there would be several periods of depreciation leading to the depreciation 
expectation, and more capital inflow would widen the gap between domestic and foreign 
interest rates; however, Japan’s low interest rate remained relatively stable from 1995 to 2009 
and was not affected by the exchange rate. 
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The Deutsche Mark experienced similar appreciation as the Japanese Yen from 1985 to 
1998. Germany’s interest rate decreased from 9.72% to 3.08% between August 1992 and 
October 1996; it did not drop below 3.08% until 1998, when the Euro currency system was 
established.   
 
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA 
The “equilibrium” value of RMB and its alleged undervaluation has been discussed in 
many papers, but it is very difficult to get a common view. Therefore, this paper will mainly 
discuss the effect of RMB appreciation rather than its “equilibrium” value. After thirty years 
of rapid development, huge trade surplus increased economic imbalances in China, and it also 
increased the risk of financial instability. At present, China pursues a crawling exchange rate 
regime both at the expense of the autonomy of monetary policy and the effectiveness of 
financial system.  
5.1 Past Appreciation and Monetary Sterilization 
5.1.1 From the Hard Peg Regime to the Crawled Pegged Regime 
Until 1994, China’s authorities controlled both current and capital account transactions. 
Figure 18: Japan's exchange rate and interest rate 
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There were multiple exchange rates in China, including the official exchange rate and market 
exchange rate. International trade could only be conducted by state-owned enterprises. In that 
sense, strong capital control separated domestic prices from international markets. 
In 1994, China’s central bank eliminated exchange controls on current account 
transactions and unified the exchange rate at 8.7 Yuan per dollar. By 1995, the nominal 
exchange rate had decreased to about 8.28 and remained stable for the next decade. During 
the 1990s, China’s export and import maintained a steady expansion, and after 2000, 
experienced accelerated growth.  
The rapid increase of current accounts led to the pressure of appreciation from the 
internal and the external fronts. On the international front, with the United States and Japan 
as representatives, the developed countries were critical of China's cheap manufacturing 
products. They argued that the low price of Made in China brought about the continual trade 
surplus so the RMB should be revalued. On the domestic front, because of the condition of 
ongoing dual surplus, the People’s Bank of China has to issue additional RMB for buying the 
foreign currency in order to maintain the stable exchange rate, which not only significantly 
increased monetary base, but also distorted the RMB exchange rate formation mechanism. 
With the RMB appreciation expectation, lots of hot money flow into China through various 
channels and posed serious threat to financial system. Therefore, the RMB exchange rate 
reform is imperative. On July 21, 2005, the People’s Bank of China announced the reform of 
exchange rate regime: an immediate appreciation by 2 percent, moving towards a more 
flexible regime. Up to August 2011, the exchange rate of RMB had appreciated to 6.3867 per 
dollar gradually, about 22.87 percent (Figure 19).  
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Figure 19: China's exchange rate 
5.1.2 Monetary Supporting Measure for the Pegged Regime 
China’s central bank had to conduct an intervention in the exchange market to maintain 
the gradual appreciation of RMB. With the increase of current account surplus and capital 
inflow, China’s central bank had to purchase foreign currency by issuing RMB, which has 
now in turn caused the rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserve. This measure stirs 
liquidity growth in the financial system and a credit boom. The liquidity growth will 
ultimately bid up the inflation rate.  
To stabilize the economy, China’s central bank has to sterilize the liquidity growth. The 
monetary policy instruments include open market operation and the placement of reserve 
requirements on commercial banks.  
China’s open market operation is different from that of developed countries. Open 
market operation concentrates on government bonds and treasury bonds in developed 
countries. In China, though, the category of government bonds is inadequate and the 
remaining amount of treasury bills is very small, too. Since 2003, the People’s Bank of China 
has issued central bank paper as a new tool of open market operation. In addition, it has also 
issued the targeted central bank paper to commercial banks, which has significantly enhanced 
their loan-making abilities.  
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The deposit reserve requirement on commercial banks is another important monetary 
tool for the People’s Bank of China to reduce abundant liquidity in money markets. Since 
June 2006, the People’s Bank of China has been raising the deposit requirement reserve ratio 
to tighten the liquidity that rose from 7.5 to 20 percent from July 2006 to March 2011 (Figure 
20). It will freeze 12.5 percent of the total 
deposit in commercial banks, about 9.6 trillion Yuan (1.46 trillion USD according to average 
exchange rate in March 2011). 
5.2 Unsustainability of China’s Current Crawled Pegged Regime 
5.2.1 Crawled Pegging Sacrifices Monetary Policy Autonomy 
According to Mundell's impossible trinity theory，A country cannot simultaneously 
achieve the free movement of capital, monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability. 
In order to maintain monetary policy autonomy and exchange rate stability, Chinese 
monetary authorities have to implement a strict control of capital flows. However, under the 
conditions of free international trade and increase of foreign direct investment, capital 
controls become more and more difficult. 
It is very hard to distinguish speculative ventures, which can flow in or out of China 
through the trade of goods and services, direct investment, portfolio investment, foreign debt 
and other items, from funds that are intended for real trade and investment. Capital control 
cannot completely prevent the inflow of capital intending to speculate on the appreciation of 
RMB. A report (2010) from State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China estimates 
that, due to Asia’s financial crisis, the total hot money outflow from 1994 to 2002 was USD 
400 billion; since 2003, driven by the expectation of RMB unilateral appreciation, the hot 
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money inflow had accumulated to 300 billion by 2010. (Calculation: Hot money = increment 
of foreign reserve – (trade surplus + FDI + gains from overseas investments + domestic 
companies’ total equity capital rising from foreign market)).  
For Chinese monetary authorities it is not easy to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime 
and a sovereign monetary policy simultaneously. China’s crawled pegging regime sacrifices 
the autonomy of its monetary policy both in the short and the long run. 
In the short term, Chinese authorities have to concern the uncovered interest parity 
effects. To pursue an optimal portfolio, the arbitrage money will flow into China if the profit 
gained from the interest differential between RMB and foreign currencies exceeds the 
transaction cost. Thus, the only option for the People’s Bank of China is to keep the interest 
rate of RMB lower than that of other currencies, especially the USD.  
In the long term, the abundant liquidity caused by the exchange rate intervention would 
lead to an increase in the inflation rate. Figure 20 shows that China’s inflation rate reached 
6% in 2011. To deal with the high inflation, the People’s Bank of China had to tighten up 
liquidity by open market operations and increase the deposit reserve requirements on 
commercial banks, both of which brought about an added cost from the worsened economic 
efficiency. 
5.2.2 Administrative Measures Eroding Economic Efficiency 
The People’s Bank of China issues the central bank paper to the commercial bank 
through the inter-bank loan market to offset the abundant liquidity that arose from the 
intervention with the foreign exchange market. The central bank has to pay the market 
interest rate for the buyer. The rapid increase of central bank paper may bid up the market 
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interest rate, which will be the direct cost induced by intervention in the foreign exchange 
market.  
The reserve requirements will freeze commercial banks’ loanable money. There are 
negative impacts on both the profitability of commercial banks and the efficiency of the 
economy. In China, most of the profits of commercial banks come from the difference 
between the lending and deposit rates; therefore, a reduction in the lending amount will 
weaken the capacity for profit. This shortage of loanable money will also result in the 
commercial banks’ preference for lending to big companies, since they will be regarded as 
less risky. This tendency, in turn, will affect small and medium-sized enterprises, which may 
have higher growth potential. In that sense, the distortion will finally erode the efficiency of 
whole economy.   
5.3 Which Way for China – German or Japanese? 
Currently, China is facing similar conditions to those of Japan and Germany from the 
late 1980s to the early 1990s. Since the RMB appreciated in July 2005, the economy has 
experienced rapid asset price increases as in Japan; however, China undertook monetary 
policies and administrative measures to hamper the accumulation of the asset price bubbles.  
5.3.1 Stock Market Fluctuation in China 
China’s stock price experienced a sharp increase from 2005 to 2007, but the authorities 
halted the increase through both monetary policies and administrative measures. Ever since 
the People’s Bank of China announced the reform of the exchange rate regime, the RMB has 
appreciated gradually, and this has given rise to further appreciation expectation. Stock prices 
began to rapidly increase in 2006. From January 2006 to October 2007, the stock price 
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increased by 377 percent, and then the bubble began to collapse (Figure 20). The sharp 
increase of stock prices and the rise of the inflation rate induced tight money policies. The 
People’s Bank of China raised the commercial bank deposit interest rate from 2.25 to 3.87 
percent and the lending rate from 5.58 to 7.29 percent. The reserve requirement ratio for the 
deposit in commercial banks increased from 8 to 13 percent. The People’s Bank of China 
accelerated the frequency of tight monetary policies, especially before the bubble burst; and 
what’s more, both interest rates and reserve requirement ratio increased every month from 
July to September 2007. Interestingly, the stock price rose almost immediately after the 
announcement of the tight monetary policy. Finally, the Ministry of Finance increased the 
stamp duty on stock transaction from 0.1 to 0.3 percent on May, 30
th
 2007. Then, the stock 
price fell rapidly. Many Chinese investors believe that it was the increase in stamp duty rather 
than the monetary policies that actually caused the collapse of stock price. 
 
Figure 20: China's monetary response to the consumer price and stock price 
It is difficult to clearly ascertain whether the monetary policy or stamp duty adjustment 
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has hindered stock prices from increasing, but it is generally hypothesized that government 
intervention is the main reason for the bubble’s collapse.   
5.3.2 House Price Increase and Strict Real Estate Market Regulations 
Facing a rapid increase in housing prices, the authorities used both financial and 
administrative policies to prevent the bubble from growing. China’s real estate market has 
experienced a rapid price increase since 1998. According to the BBAV Research (2011), 
housing prices doubled from 2001 to 2010 while the ratio of rents grew only 30% (Figure 21). 
Compared to the international bubble experiences, China’s housing prices did not rise as 
much as in other countries (Figure 22), but China’s authorities considered that the rise in the 
housing prices was too fast to be sustainable and thus took four kinds of measures to lessen it. 
The first measure was to increase the mortgage interest rate and down payment ratio. The 
State Council increased the minimum mortgage interest rate from 70 percent of benchmark 
interest rate to 1.1 times. Meanwhile, the down payment for buying a second house rose from 
30 to 60 percent. The second measure was increasing the transaction tax to limit speculations. 
The government started to charge 5 percent of the house price for the business tax, provided 
that the sale took place less than 5 years after the purchase. The third measure was 
administrative restrictions on the purchase of house. In large and medium-sized cities, if a 
family had 2 or more houses, they were prohibited from buying any additional ones. The 
fourth measure was to provide more public houses. The 12
th
 Five-Year Plan of 2011-2015 
announced construction of 36 million units of public housing in the next 5 years. The effect 
of these measurements emerged gradually. Figure 23 shows that there is no more rapid 
growth in 2011.  
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Figure 22: International comparison of price bubbles 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Residential property rental index in China 
Figure 23: China's house price in big cities (2011) 
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Japan’s bubble between the late 1980s and the early 1990s had three characteristics: a 
rapid rise in asset prices, the overheating of economic activities, and a sizable increase in 
money supply and credit (Okina et al., 2001). China also experienced a rapid rise in asset 
prices from 2005 to 2010, but Chinese authorities used the monetary policies and 
administrative measures to puncture the bubble in advance. As a result, the asset price 
fluctuation did not significantly weaken the effect of monetary policies. 
5.3.3 Inflation Rate Increase with Currency Appreciation 
The Chinese Yuan appreciated 22.87 percent from July 2005 to August 2011. Like what 
was witnessed in Japan and Germany, asset prices rose though the trend was disturbed by the 
global financial crisis in 2008. Unlike Japan’s stable inflation rate during the period of asset 
price appreciation, China’s inflation rate shared the same upward trend as asset prices.  
There is no sign that the increase of asset prices has weakened the effect of easy 
monetary policy. The money supply (M2) did not deviate significantly from the monetary 
base (M1) (Figure 24). Because of the administrative measure on controlling the housing 
prices, the amount of new mortgage loans has remained stable since 2010, and the share of 
new mortgages in the total of new loans has declined since 2009 (Figure 25). 
 
Figure 24: Monetary aggregates in China 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Japan’s liquidity trap happened immediately after the appreciation of the Japanese Yen, 
which has been referred to as a supporting evidence for the popular argument against RMB 
appreciation and a floating exchange rate regime. However, the comparison between the 
experiences of Japan and Germany shows that the appreciation of the Japanese Yen was not 
the cause of Japan’s liquidity trap. Similar appreciations of domestic currencies led to 
different economic performances in Japan and Germany.  
Right after the burst of Japan’s asset price bubbles between 1990 and 1991, Japan’s 
inflation and interest rates diverged from those of Germany. The determinant of this 
divergence was the burst of asset price bubbles. From the late 1980s to the early 90s, Japan’s 
asset market experienced significant fluctuations. In the late 80s, asset prices surged and the 
money supply increased as well. The economy overheated, but the consumer price and major 
indicators of the economy remained quite stable. After the bubble burst in the early 90s, the 
asset prices decreased sharply. In the aftermath of the bubble burst, nonperforming loans 
Figure 25: New mortgage loans in China 
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accumulated in the financial system. Then, the inflation rate and interest rate declined and the 
Japanese economy entered the era of zero interest rate.  
The differences between Japanese and German interest rates stemmed from the different 
effects of easy monetary policies. In the early 1990s, both countries issued easy monetary 
policies, but the results differed. Germany successfully increased the money supply, whereas 
Japan failed due to the bubble’s burst in 1990s. According to the Fisher’s theory, the 
long-term interest rate is determined by the inflation rate, and the inflation rate is determined 
by money supply (M2). Given the income velocity of money being constant, the price will be 
determined by the money aggregate and the amount of output. The growth rate of output 
always remains stable, whereas the inflation rate changes with the growth rate of money 
supply.  
For China, indeed, there has been an accumulation of asset prices since the gradual 
appreciation in 2005, similar to Japan’s experience in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, China’s 
authorities implemented monetary policies and administrative measures to puncture the stock 
price bubble and dampen the increase of real estate prices.  
As discussed in previous sections of this paper, China’s current crawled peg regime is 
not sustainable due to the weakening effectiveness of capital control and the sacrifice of 
autonomy and economic efficiency. Financial liberalization is the ultimate way out for 
sustainable economic development. In this respect, the paper draws a different conclusion 
from that of McKinnon (2006) though sharing the same assumption. It is assumed in this 
paper that the restrictions on commercial bank deposits and lending interest rates as well as 
the controls on international capital movements are removed. Two different outcomes on the 
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inflation rate and the interest rate can occur, depending on whether there is government 
intervention on foreign exchange rate or not. Firstly, if the authorities of China intervene in 
the foreign exchange market to delay the appreciation, the market will expect further 
appreciation. The expectation of continuous appreciation will cause capital inflow and will 
result in abundant liquidity. In the long run, the abundant liquidity will lead to the increase of 
the inflation rate and the interest rate. Secondly, if there is no government intervention in the 
foreign exchange rate, then capital inflow will lead the exchange rate to an equilibrium level 
as the market expects. The domestic liquidity will become independent from the foreign 
exchange market, so the inflation rate and interest rate will be immune to the fluctuation of 
the exchange rate. Thus, the liquidity trap is only the case of Japan. Japan’s story will not 
have to be retold in China.  
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